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Flower v. Bricker, 178 Ark. 764, 12 S.W. (2d) 394 (1929). And where the prior mortgagee was assured by the junior mortgagee that taxes had been paid, and that no prior
lien was in existence, the latter was estopped to assert a prior lien for the taxes he had
paid. Warranty Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Cimirro Construction Co., iir N.J.Eq. 8, i6o
AUt. 847

(1932),

affd. 113 N.J.Eq. 31, 166 At. 198 (V933).

In a few jurisdictions, the

problem has been recognized by the legislature and the taxpaying junior incumbrancer
given a prior lien by statute. Ky. Stat. (1930), § 4o32;La. Civ. Code (1932), Art. 2161;
see Timken v. Wisner Estates, 153 La. 262, 95 So. 711 (1923).

MisHA RuBm
Partnership-Individual Liability of Beneficiaries of Business Trust-[New York].
-Defendants formed a syndicate agreement to deal in bank stock with sole control
vested in named managers. The agreement restricted the liability of a participant to
the amount contributed. Plaintiff who knew of the agreement brought this action to
recover the balance due on a promissory note or the same balance due for money lent.
The courts below held the agreement created a trust and that the managers would be
solely liable. Held, judgment below reversed. The subscribers are liable as partners,
and the plaintiff is bound by the agreement to restrict liability. Brown v. Bedell, 263
N.Y. 177, 188 N.E. 641 (1934).
The business trust has been used as a device to escape partnership liability and to
secure corporate advantages where there is an inability to incorporate or a desire to
avoid corporate burdens. See Weber Co. v. Alter, 12o Kan. 557, 245 Pac. 143, 46 A.L.R.
158 (1926); Bonbright and Means, The Holding Company (1932), 81, 120, 207-208,
218; Warren, Corporate Advantages without Incorporation (1929), 398; Powell, The
Passing of the Corporation in Business, 2 Minn. L. Rev. 4O (I918); Massachusetts
Trusts, 37 Yale L. Jour. iio3 (1928). The investors, while contributing capital for the
purpose of profit making, seek to be protected from personal liability on the theory that
as cestuis they are not answerable for the debts of the trust. Dantzler v. Mclnnis, 151
Ala. 293, 44 So. 193 (1907); Goldwaterv. Altman, 210 Cal. 408, 292 Pac. 624 (1930); Falardeauv. Boston Art Assn., 182 Mass. 405, 65 N.E. 797 (19o3); see i9 Cal. L. Rev. 42

(193o). Some jurisdictions have permitted such insulation from liability where the investors have retained little or no control over the trustees. Dana v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 227 Mass. 562, 116 N.E. 947 (1917); Greco v. Hubbard,252 Mass. 37, 147
N.E. 272 (1925). Investors retaining no control, without the protection of the trust,

are like dormant partners, who in order to escape partnership liability would probably have to comply with the limited partnership statutes. But see Giles v. Velte,
263 U.S. 553, 44 Sup. Ct. 157, 68 L. Ed. 44i (1924); Crane, Are Limited Partnerships
Necessary?, 17 Minn. L. Rev. 35i (1933). Even the protection of the trust has been in-

sufficient in some jurisdictions to prevent liability to the investors because the legislature by authorizing certain business devices for limiting liability has been said to
have negatived the use of others. Reillyv. Clyne, 27 Ariz. 432, 234 Pac. 35 (1925); Willey
v. Hoggson Corp., 9o Fla. 343, 353, io6 So. 408 (1925); McClaren v. Dawes Elec. Sign
& Mfg. Co., 86 Ind. App. x96, 156 N.E. 584 (1927); Weber Engine Co. v. Barley, 123
Kan. 665, 266 Pac. 8o3 (1927); Thompson v. Schmitt, 115 Tex. 53, 274 S.W. 554 (1925);
State v. Paine,137 Wash. 566, 243 Pac. 2 (1926); see Magruder, The Position of Shareholders in Business Trusts, 23 Col. L. Rev. 423 (1923); Brown, Contractual Limitation

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
of Liability by the So-Called "Massachusetts Trust," 3 Ind. L. Jour. 318 (1928). And
it has been said that the protection granted the cestuis by courts of equity together
with the profit-making purpose of the association should render the cestuis personally
liable. Thompson v. Schmitt, 115 Tex. 53, 274 S.W. 554 (1925). The trustee's right to
reimbursement from the trust estate, and, if that is insufficient, then against the beneficiary personally, has been suggested as a means of placing an indirect liability upon
the investors, where the existence of the trust is regarded as a bar to direct obligation.
Hardoon v. Beilios, [19O1] A.C. 118; Stevens, Limited Liability in Business Trusts, 7
Corn. L. Quar. 116 (1922); Hildebrand, Liability of Trustees, Property, and Shareholders of a Massachusetts Trust, 2 Tex. L. Rev. 139, 165 (1924). But even in jhrisdictions where an investor without control is protected by the trust device, an investor
who has the power to "make rules for the conduct of the business and to direct the
trustees in any matter" is held liable on the theory that the association created is a
partnership and the trustees are agents. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 Yale L. Jour. 720, 741 (1929); Betts v. Hackathorn,159 Ark. 621, 626,
252 S.W. 602, 604, 31 A.L.R. 847,850 (1923); Sivison v. Klipstein, 262 Fed. 823 (1920);
Frost v. Thompsot, 219 Mass. 360, io6 N.E. 109 (1914).
The New York Court apparently has recognized that a trust will bar the investor's
liability to creditors where little or no control is retained. Jones v. Gould, 209 N.Y.
419, 1O3 N.E. 720 (1913); Barnesv. Chase Nat. Bank, 225 App. Div. 102, 232 N.Y.S.
224 (1928), affd. 251 N.Y. 551, 168 N.E. 423 (1929). The investors in the present case
seemed to have retained no control, but the court, declaring that it "should not be
solicitous to give corporate advantages without incorporation" and that it had an
"abundance of authority to sustain" its position, found that no trust existed to bar
liability inasmuch as there was no formal conveyance of title to the managers and the
managers were not called trustees. 263 N.Y. 189; see Riley, Business Trusts and Their
Relation to West Virginia Law, 28 West Va. L. Quar. 287, 288 (1922).
Assuming that the trust device has not insulated the investors from liability, a
creditor may be limited by his express agreement from holding either the manager or
the investors. Shelton v. Montoya, 292 S.W. 165 (Tex. Com. App. 1927); Philip Carey
Co. v. Pingree, 223 Mass. 352, 1ii N.E. 857 (1916). Furthermore, as in the present case,
the creditor's knowledge that the investors intended and believed their liability to be
limited has been held to so limit their liability as to that creditor. McCarthy v. Parker,
243 Mass. 465, 138 N.E. 8 (1923); Hotchin v. Kent, 8 Mich. 526 (186o); contra: Victor
Refining Co. v. City Nat. Bank of Cmininerce, 115 Tex. 71, 274 S.W. 561 (1925); see
Wrightington, Voluntary Associations in Massachusetts, 21 Yale L. Jour. 311, 319

This result has been reached either on the basis of estoppel or on the doctrine
that one who knows an agent is unauthorized to act cannot hold the principal for the
unauthorized act. Dunning v. Gibbs, 213 Ky. 81 (1926); Roberts v. Aberdeen Syndicate, 198 N.C. 381, 151 S.E. 865 (193o); cf. Chapmanv. Witt, 285 S.W. 331 (Tex. Civil
App. 1926). It is analogous to the denial to a creditor of the right to hold the shareholder of a defectively organized corporation (not a defacto corporation) personally
liable when he has dealt with them as shareholders with limited liability. Ballantine,
Corporations (1927), §§ 28, 29. But it is perhaps inconsistent with the doctrine that
members of a defective limited partnership are personally liable to a creditor who
knew they represented themselves as limited partners. Andrews v. Schott, io Pa. St. 47
(1848). And with the fact that trustees of a business trust held to be a partnership
(1912).
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will be personally liable to a creditor who knew of the existence of partners but not
their identity. i Mechem Agency (2d ed. 1914), § 1169; Restatement of the Law of
Agency (r933), § 336, comment C.
In the present case, the court held the plaintiff bound by his knowledge of the agreement by the partners to restrict their liability. It is not clear whether the liability of
the managers, who were also investors, was intended by the court to be similarly limited.
In Illinois the position of a shareholder without control in a business trust is uncertain. See Judah, Possible Partnership Liability under the Business Trust, 17 Ill. L.
Rev. 77 (1922). A strong dictum in Schumann-Heink v. Folson, 328 11. 321, 159 N.E.
250, 58 A.L.R. 485 (1928) recognized the shareholders' immunity from personal liability to creditors, but the case actually involved an express contract by the creditor not
to hold the trustees personally liable, and the court gave effect to that contract. On the
other hand, an equally strong dictum in Hunter v. Winter, 268 Ill. App. 487 (1932) indicates that the shareholders will be answerable to creditors, although the decision merely
held trustees personally liable in the absence of an express contract against personal
liability as was present in the Schumann-Heink case. The use of the trust device in
Illinois was no doubt stimulated by the prohibition in the former General Corporation
Act against corporations founded for the purpose of owning and dealing in real estate.
Ill. Cahill's Rev. Stat. (1931), c. 32, § 1o. See Aaron, The Massachusetts Trust as Distinguished from Partnership, 12 Ill. L. Rev. 482 (1918). Thepresent Business Corporation Act removes that restriction. Ill. Cahill's Rev. Stat. (1933), c. 32, § 7.
HARoLD AL-RFD LIPON
Taxation-Excise Tax upon Sales of Stock Made Outside the Jurisdiction[Federal].-A Florida statute placed a stamp tax upon "all sales, agreements to sell,
or memoranda of sales or deliveries of, [or] transfers of legal title to shares," whether or
not entered upon the books of the corporation; and upon written obligations to pay
money which were made, executed, or transferred in Florida. [Laws (Ex. Sess. I93I),
c. 15787]. Plaintiffs, doing business as brokers in Florida, sought to enjoin the levying
of the tax, presumably upon transactions wherein the plaintiffs received orders to sell
stock from customers in Florida and executed the sales on the New York exchange.
Held, (i) that the tax was unconstitutional as applied to sales of stock of foreign corporations made outside the state; (2) that as to shares of a Florida corporation and
transfers thereof made on the company books in Florida, the tax was valid, even though
the sales were executed outside the state; and (3) that stockbrokers' loans to clients
on margin accounts were subject to the tax as transactions distinct from the sale or
purchase of the stock. Bickell v. Lee, 5 F. Supp. 720 (D.C.N.D. Fla. 1934).
In addition to Florida, tax statutes of this type have been enacted by the federal
government, 43 Stat. 331 (1024), 26 U.S.C.A. § 9o(3) (1928); Indiana, Acts (1933),
c. 8i; Massachusetts, Gen. Laws (1932), c. 64; New York, Cahill's Cons. Laws (193o),
c. 6i, §§ 270-281; Pennsylvania, 72 Purdon's Stat. (i931), §§ 2041, 2042; South Carolina, Code (1932), § 2525. Since most sales of shares take place in New York the present decision serves to prevent states other than New York from realizing any considerable income from taxing transactions of this character. The severity of the decision
is lessened by the holding that loans upon margin accounts are subject to an excise
tax.

